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SIGNING STATEMENTS AND DIVIDED GOVERNMENT
Neal Devins*
A striking but largely unnoticed feature of the controversy spurred by George W.
Bush's aggressive use of signing statements is that Republicans, with only a brief
interruption, controlled both houses of Congress from 2000 until 2006.' The question
of why a Republican President would use signing statements to slap down a Republican
Congress did not meaningfully register in either a July 2006 American Bar Association
(ABA) Task Force Report, a series of Boston Globe articles that won the Pulitzer
Prize, or congressional hearings held by Republicans in June 2006 and Democrats in
January 2007.2 The subject of this controversy, instead, has been whether the President
has a legal duty to enforce laws he thinks are unconstitutional and, relatedly, whether
the President is improperly expanding his power by "quietly claim[ing] the authority
to disobey more than [800] laws enacted since he took office."3
I do not doubt the appropriateness of journalists, academics, and lawmakers
focusing their energies on the related questions of whether Presidents can disobey
laws they sign and, even if they can, whether President Bush is nevertheless going
too far in pushing his vision of presidential power. Those questions should be front
and center in this conversation. At the same time, I think the question of how the
President's use of signing statements might differ in periods of unified and divided
government is worth examining.4
* Goodridge Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and
Mary. Thanks to Matt Getty and Jonathan Hyslop for helping me research this Essay. Thanks
to Katherine Martin, Paul LaFata, Mike Pacella, and the Bill of Rights Journal staff for putting
together such a good event. Thanks also to Nelson Lund, Bill Marshall, Renee Letow Lerner,
Dave Lewis, and Chris Kelley for sharing their insights with me.
1 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2007, at 249
(2007).
2 Am. BAR Ass'N, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/op/signing
statements/abafinal-signingstatements recommendation-reporL_7-24-06.pdf; David Mehegan,
Globe Writer Wins Pulitzerfor National Reporting, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 17, 2007, at Al;
Charlie Savage, House Panel Probing Bush's Record on Signing Statements, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 1, 2007, at A4; Jonathon Weisman, Bush's Challenges of Laws He Signed is Criticized,
WASH. POST, June 28, 2006, at A9.
' Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at
Al (noting that the President had objected to more than 750 statutory provisions by April 2006).
When Democrats gained control of Congress in 2007, the number of "objectionable" pro-
visions had climbed to 800. Full Comm. Oversight Hearing on Signing Statements Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (opening statement of John Conyers, Jr.,
Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary).
' I am not the first person to examine this issue. Christopher S. Kelley and Bryan W.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
In this Essay, I will focus on the use of signing statements to advance the President's
policy agenda. My central claim is that Presidents have far stronger incentives to use
signing statements to advance their agendas in periods of divided government. I am
not arguing, however, that our system of checks and balances would be improved
by increasing the use of signing statements during periods of divided government. Even
though I will call attention to ways in which Presidents have advanced their political
agendas through unilateral action, I do not take a position on the larger question of
whether Presidents have too much or too little power vis-a-vis Congress.' My argu-
ment is straightforward: when the President and Congress are of the same party,
Presidents can advance their policy agendas by working informally with Congress and
federal agencies. In periods of divided government, Presidents have less control of
agency heads and less influence in Congress. Pre-enforcement directives-like signing
statements-can be used to constrain agency discretion, signal Congress about presi-
dential priorities, and-like other forms of unilateral presidential action-shift the
burden to those who disapprove of presidential policies to override instructions to
agency heads.
The fact that Presidents should make greater use of policy-based signing statements
in periods of divided government does not mean that Presidents, in fact, have used sign-
ing statements for this purpose. Unlike executive orders, signing statements do not
have much of a historical pedigree. Before Ronald Reagan sought to centralize presi-
dential power through a host of 1980s reforms, Presidents hardly ever attached a sign-
ing statement to legislation.6 More than that, even though Reagan's legal team saw
Marshall have considered some of the questions examined in this Essay, providing empirical
support for the propositions that Presidents will use signing statements to unilaterally advance
their policy agendas and that signing statements are an especially useful tool to Presidents in
periods of divided government. See Christopher S. Kelley & Bryan W. Marshall, The Last
Mover Advantage: Presidential Power and the Role of Signing Statements (2006) (unpublished
paper, on file with author). My Essay supplements this paper, providing additional details of
how presidential administration is shaped by party control in Congress. In so doing, I provide
additional support for the claim that signing statements are especially useful to Presidents during
periods of divided government. Unlike Kelley and Marshall, however, I do not limit my analysis
to signing statements. I focus, instead, on pre-enforcement directives that limit agency dis-
cretion. Signing statements are one type of pre-enforcement directive; presidential memoranda
are another type. In so doing, I consider a question that Kelley and Marshall do not examine,
namely, whether Presidents should prefer signing statements to other types of pre-enforcement
directives. See infra Part II.
' For an argument that Presidents have too little power, see Steven G. Calabresi & James
Lindgren, The President: Lightning Rod or King?, 115 YALE L.J. 2611 (2006). For an argu-
ment that Presidents have too much power, focusing on budget and war, see Louis FISHER,
CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR AND SPENDING (2000).
6 See T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT FOR CONGRESS: PRESIDENTIAL
SIGNING STATEMENTS: CONSTrrUrIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 2-10 (2007),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf; Phillip J. Cooper, George W.
Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the Use and Abuse of Presidential Signing Statements, 35
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signing statements as a useful mechanism for centralizing executive branch policy
priorities,7 Reagan made only sporadic use of pre-enforcement signing statements. In
short, because no President has systematically used signing statements to advance his
policy agenda, there is little hard evidence to assess differences between policy-based
signing statements in periods of unified and divided government.
In explaining why Presidents should see policy-driven signing statements as a
useful mechanism to advance their agendas in periods of divided government, this Essay
will proceed in two parts. Part I will detail why Presidents have incentives to pursue
their policy agendas through unilateral action. Executive orders, unilateral presidential
war-making, and structural initiatives that allow Presidents to centralize and coordinate
agency policymaking are well documented examples of this phenomenon. Signing
statements and other ex ante efforts to instruct agencies on how they should inter-
pret recently enacted legislation likewise allow Presidents to advance their policy
agendas. Part I will explain why policy-driven signing statements are especially use-
ful in periods of divided government. Specifically, during periods of divided govern-
ment, Congress is unlikely to back the President's preferred legislative agenda, so
presidential policymaking often requires unilateral action (whether it be an executive
order or a signing statement that provides a pro-President spin on legislation). More
significantly, Congress is more likely to use its oversight and confirmation powers to
pressure agency heads to advance a legislative agenda at odds with the President's
policy priorities. This is especially true today; the ideological gap between Democrats
and Republicans has never been wider, and consequently, Congress-President relations
have become increasingly acrimonious during periods of divided government.8 Against
this backdrop, Presidents have good reason to use signing statements and other pre-
enforcement directives as a tool to both rein in agency heads and signal lawmakers
about the President's willingness to battle over his preferred interpretation of a
recently enacted statute.
Before turning to Part I, a comment about George W. Bush's extensive use of
signing statements in a period of unified government: more than anything, the Bush
White House used signing statements to advance its vision of a strong presidency-
voicing constitutional objections to legislation impinging on presidential power, espe-
cially the President's power as Commander in Chief.9 With a supportive Congress,
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 515, 516-20 (2005); Christopher S. Kelley, The Unitary Executive
and the Presidential Signing Statement 41-75 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Miami
University), available at http://www.ohiolink.edu/etd/view.cgi?miami 1057716977; see also
DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER 52-57 (1992) (discussing Reagan
administration efforts to coordinate agency policymaking through signing statements).
' See KMIEC, supra note 6, at 52.
8 On the other hand, party line voting is a boon to Presidents in periods of unified govern-
ment. For this reason, as suggested above, Presidents-during periods of unified government-
have less reason to make use of policy directives to fend off a too aggressive Congress.
9 See Walter Dellinger, Op-Ed, A Slip of the Pen, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2006, at A17
(noting that the controversy over President Bush's claims that he will not enforce the laws that
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the President could launch such attacks without fearing a legislative backlash.' 0
Congressional retaliation was also unlikely because the President did not meaning-
fully follow through on threats not to enforce laws that he found unconstitutional."
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that constitutional theorists in the Bush
White House would see signing statements as an excellent vehicle to make broad
claims about presidential power.' 2
After the 2006 elections, however, the costs of launching such rhetorical broadsides
have increased. With Democrats now in control of Congress, democratic lawmakers
will use their oversight powers to challenge presidential claims of inherent power. 13
Presidents, in other words, can make more effective use of signing statements as a bully
pulpit to assert broad claims of executive power during periods of unified government
(where those claims will not be countered) than in periods of divided government.
More to the point, the very forces that should push the White House to make greater
use of signing statements and other pre-enforcement directives to advance their policy
priorities during periods of divided government should also push the White House
to tone down their campaign to use signing statements as a bully pulpit for a strong
presidency. "4
he signs should be viewed as an "attack on the current president" because this controversy has
been precipitated by "this administration's sweeping claims of unilateral executive power,"
precisely its "extravagant claims of unilateral authority to govern").
10 See Savage, supra note 3 (noting that "Bush's fellow Republicans control both cham-
bers, and they have shown limited interest in launching the kind of oversight that could damage
their party").
" See Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive
Power 21 (U. Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 133, 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=922400 (noting that "critics of the Bush administration's
use of signing statements have not identified a single instance where the Bush administration
followed through on the language in the signing statement and refused to enforce the statute
as written"). A June 2007 GAO Report, however, concludes that the Bush administration dis-
obeyed six laws that the President had challenged in signing statements. See Charlie Savage,
U.S. Agencies Disobey 6 Laws that President Challenged, BOSTON GLOBE, June 19, 2007,
at Al.
12 See Charlie Savage, Cheney Aide is Screening Legislation, BOSTON GLOBE, May 28,
2006, at Al (noting the critical role that David Addington, chief of staff and legal advisor to
Vice President Cheney, plays in Bush's signing statement campaign).
13 Witness, for example, House Judiciary Committee Chair John Conyers's decision to
make presidential signing statements the subject of the very first oversight hearing that he
scheduled three weeks after Democrats took over Congress in January 2007. See Presidential
Signing Statements Under the Bush Administration: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007); Savage, supra note 2.
1" This is not to say that the Bush White House will moderate its use of constitutional
signing statements. For example, the presidential (and vice presidential) advisors that are behind
President Bush's signing statement campaign may see the benefits of asserting a strong vision
of presidential power as outweighing the costs of contentious oversight hearings, etc. See
Savage, supra note 12 (discussing the role of Vice President Cheney's office in pushing for the
more aggressive use of signing statements). With that said, the signing statement controversy
[Vol. 16:63
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I. THE PRESIDENTIAL POWER OF UNILATERAL ACTION15
Presidential policymaking is often pursued through executive orders, directives,
and other unilateral acts. The reason is two-fold: first, Congress is often unwilling
to enact the President's policy priorities into law; second, unilateral presidential action
often expands the scope of presidential power. "The opportunities for presidential
imperialism are too numerous to count.., because, when presidents feel it is in their
political interests, they can put whatever decisions they like to strategic use, both in
gaining policy advantage and in pushing out the boundaries of their power."'
16
Consider, for example, Bill Clinton's health care reforms and George W. Bush's
faith-based initiatives. In both instances, the President went to Congress seeking
legislative authorization for his policy agenda. Here, Congress had the upper hand.
Rather than having to do battle with the President on his own field (enacting legis-
lation that is subject to a presidential veto), it is up to the President to cajole Congress
into action. In both cases, Congress did not bite, leaving it to the President either to
abandon his policy initiative or pursue it through unilateral action. Clinton did so by
issuing "directives that established a patient's bill of rights for federal employees,
[reforming] health care programs' appeals processes, and [setting] new penalties for
companies that deny health coverage to the poor and people with pre-existing medical
conditions."' 7 Bush likewise advanced his agenda through unilateral action. He issued
an executive order establishing the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives and "ordered an internal audit of department regulations, procurement
policies, and practices that discouraged (or forbade) faith-based organizations."18
The lesson here is simple. Presidents will look for ways to advance their policy
priorities, even if it means going over the heads of Congress.19 Unilateral action, as
the Bush and Clinton examples make clear, is often pursued because Congress typically
chooses not to respond, or its response is ineffective. Witness, for example, executive
orders: between 1973 and 1998, Presidents issued roughly one thousand executive
seems to have quieted (at least during the first nine months of the Democratically controlled
Congress). A factiva.com search of newspaper stories (from January to October 2007) yielded
no stories about controversial assertions of presidential power through signing statements.
" The title for this section is based on Terry Moe and William Howell's outstanding and
highly influential article. Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of
UnilateralAction, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132 (1999). Four paragraphs from this section are
drawn from Neal Devins, Abdication by Another Name: An Ode to Lou Fisher, 19 ST. Louis
U. PUB. L. REv. 65 (2000).
16 Moe & Howell, supra note 15, at 138.
17 William G. Howell, Unilateral Powers: A Brief Overview, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
417, 418 (2005).
18 Id. at 434-35.
19 It is often the case, however, that Presidents need Congress to appropriate funds to back
presidential initiatives. When that happens, Congress has the upper hand. "Members can attach
any number of stipulations on how the president spends the appropriated moneys, limiting what
the program, agency, or commission does, whom it serves, what it reports, and how effectively
it operates." WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION 121 (2003).
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orders.2' Only thirty-seven of these orders were challenged in Congress.21 More strik-
ing, only three of these challenges resulted in legislation.22 Furthermore, by end-running
the burdensome and often unsuccessful strategy of seeking legislative authorization,
unilateral presidential action expands the institutional powers and prerogatives of the
presidency. In other words, the President's personal interests and the presidency's
institutional interests are often one and the same.
Unlike the presidency, the individual and institutional interests of members of
Congress are often in conflict with one another. While each of Congress' s 535 members
has some stake in Congress as an institution, parochial interests will overwhelm this
collective good. In particular, members of Congress need to be reelected to advance
their (and their constituents') interests. For this reason, lawmakers "are trapped in
a prisoners' dilemma: all might benefit if they could cooperate in defending or ad-
vancing Congress's power, but each has a strong incentive to free ride in favor of
the local constituency. ,23
Presidential incentives to act unilaterally extend beyond the pursuit of substantive
policy goals and structural reforms that buttress presidential control of the adminis-
trative state. Examples abound, including the centralization of agency policymaking
through Office of Management and Budget review of proposed agency regulations,
Justice Department control of agency litigation, the use of political appointees both
to staff agencies and to implement agency policies, and the use of presidential signing
statements and pre-regulatory directives to ensure agency conformity to the President's
policy agenda.24 Through such unilateral action, Presidents have simultaneously
pursued their policy agendas while significantly expanding the power of the presidency.
20 Moe & Howell, supra note 15, at 165-66.
21 Id.
22 Id. For a more complete inventory of congressional acquiescence to unilateral presidential
policymaking, see HOWELL, supra note 19, at 112-120.
23 Moe & Howell, supra note 15, at 144. Kenneth Mayer makes a similar point in his study
of executive orders, noting that legislators respond to "issues directly affecting their constit-
uents," not "vague concerns that the president is encroaching on its administrative or proce-
dural prerogatives." KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: ExEcuTIvE ORDERS
AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 27 (2001).
24 For a general treatment of this subject, emphasizing Clinton-era initiatives, see Elena
Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245 (2001). For a discussion of how
Presidents use executive orders to reorganize the federal bureaucracy, see PHILIPIJ. COOPER,
BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT 15-38 (2002). For a discussion of Office of Management and
Budget review and presidential signing statements and directives, see infra note 78 and accom-
panying text. For an excellent treatment of the politicization of agency personnel (through the
unilateral expansion of the President's power to staff agencies), see David E. Lewis, Staffing
Alone: Unilateral Action and the Politicization of the Executive Office of the President,
1988-2004, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 496 (2005). For an examination of presidential
incentives to coordinate legal policymaking in the Justice Department, see Neal Devins &
Michael Herz, The Battle that Never Was: Congress, the White House, andAgency Litigation
Authority, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 1998, at 205.
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Signing statements and pre-enforcement directives typify this practice. As part
of its efforts to assert control over the executive branch, the Reagan administration saw
signing statements as an excellent vehicle to attack perceived congressional excess.25
According to Doug Kmiec, one of the architects of Reagan's signing statement initiative,
Congress sought to limit presidential control of the administrative state by enacting
veto-proof omnibus legislation and by leaving it to agencies (and their congressional
overseers) to fill in the details of vague statutory language.26 Kmiec argued that the
"signing statement was 'crucial for the administration to give the executive branch
direction top-down on inevitable interpretation, rather than relying solely upon the
far less transparent judgment of someone in an executive agency applying the law for
the first time."' 27 Through the use of pre-enforcement directives, the Clinton admin-
istration made "presidential intervention in regulatory matters ever more routine and
agency acceptance of this intervention ever more ready."28 In particular, because these
directives were overt and official, the President was able to "accomplish what backdoor
pressure cannot," that is, impelling recalcitrant agency officials to follow the President's
lead and "even more important, locking in that action over time."29
Presidential power, as the above discussion makes clear, is much more than "the
power to persuade. '30 By acting unilaterally, Presidents are well positioned to advance
25 Reagan administration efforts to transform the signing statement into a policymaking
tool drew some fire from Congress. See Frank B. Cross, The Constitutional Legitimacy and
Significance of Presidential "Signing Statements, "40 ADMIN. L. REV. 209 (1988). Likewise,
the first President Bush drew fire for his efforts to make use of a signing statement to direct
federal agencies to "phase out regulations authorizing the use of racial preferences and quotas
in hiring and promotions." Steven A. Holmes, Bush to Order End of Rules Allowing Race-
Based Hiring, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1991 at Al.
26 KMIEC, supra note 6, at 52-53.
27 Kelley & Marshall, supra note 4, at 6 (quoting Douglas Kmiec). Kmiec's argument
stresses policy coordination, not the related efforts of the Reagan administration to influence
judicial decisionmaking by having signing statements included in the legislative history pub-
lished in the United States Code Congressional and Administrative News. See also COOPER,
supra note 24, at 215-16 (depicting the Reagan signing statement initiative as an effort to
influence judicial decisionmaking).
28 Kagan, supra note 24, at 2299. For a general treatment of presidential memoranda, see
COOPER, supra note 24, at 81-116. The Clinton administration also saw signing statements
as a mechanism to direct agency officials to adhere to presidential priorities. Walter Dellinger,
who headed the Clinton Office of Legal Counsel, said that signing statements were sometimes
used to direct "subordinate officers within the Executive Branch how to interpret or admin-
ister the enactment." Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Ass't Att'y Gen., to Bernard N.
Nussbaum, Counsel to the President (Nov. 3, 1993), in Recent Legal Opinions Concerning
Presidential Powers, 48 ARK. L. REV. 311, 333 (1995).
29 Kagan, supra note 24, at 2299. For this very reason, Clinton made extensive use of
directives, issuing 107 as compared to 9 by President Reagan and 4 by the first President
Bush. Id. at 2294.
30 RicHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIALPOWER: THE PoLrncs OFLEADERSHIP 10 (1960).
2007]
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their interests before Congress, the nation, and the world-so much so that critics of
the modem day presidency complain that our system of checks and balances has been
displaced by a regime in which Presidents "regularly 'go over the heads' of Congress"
so that the powers of the American people have been invested in a single office.31
Irrespective of whether presidential critics overstate their case, it is certainly true that
"presidents care intensely about securing changes that promote their institutional power,
while legislators typically do not. [Lawmakers] are unlikely to oppose incremental
increases in the relative power of presidents unless the issue in question directly harms
the special interests of their constituents.' 32 Efforts by the Reagan and Clinton adminis-
trations "to ensure bureaucratic responsiveness to the president" through signing state-
ments and pre-enforcement directives exemplify today's administrative presidency.33
Another feature of the modem day presidency is the need for the President to
advance his agenda in periods of divided government. When Congress and President
come from different political parties (as they typically do), ideological polarization
in Congress stands as a significant roadblock to the President's ability to advance his
political agenda. The rise of unilateral presidential policymaking is, in significant re-
spects, tied to divided government. In particular, as the next Part will detail, Congress
is more likely to make use of its appointments and oversight powers to press a compet-
ing policy agenda before federal agencies during periods of divided government. To
combat Congress and advance their policy agendas, Presidents have greater incentive
to act unilaterally in periods of divided government.
I. SIGNING STATEMENTS AND DIVIDED GOVERNMENT
Before 1955, the party in control of the White House invariably controlled
Congress.34 Since 1955 and especially since 1969, divided government has been the
norm.35 When George W. Bush leaves the White House, government will have been
divided for thirty of the prior forty years (or seventy-five percent of the time).36
31 JEFFREY K. TuLIs, THE RHETORICALPRESIDENCY4 (1987); see also HOWELL, supra note
19, at 134-35 (summarizing evidence about the President's ability to make policy without
fear "that a watchful Congress will. .. subsequently overturn him").
32 Terry M. Moe, The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Presidential Advantage, in
THE PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL SYsTEM 437,448 (Michael Nelson ed., 5th ed. 1999).
" MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS? POLITICS AND
ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS 5 (2000).
34 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REv. 2311, 2330 (2006).
31 Id. at2331.
36 Before the 2000 presidential election, "government was divided for twenty-six of [the
prior] thirty-two years" (eighty-one percent). See id. From 2001 to 2003, Republicans con-
trolled the White House and House of Representatives; Democrats controlled the Senate. From
2003 to 2006, Republicans controlled Congress and the White House; Democrats regained
control of Congress in 2007.
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This Part will focus on two ways that Congress seeks to exert control over the
administrative state during periods of divided government: lawmaker oversight of
agency decisionmaking and the Senate's use of its power to confirm agency heads.
Focusing on Congress's confirmation and oversight powers, I will argue that presi-
dential influence over the administrative state is limited during periods of divided
government. As such, Presidents have an incentive to find ways to exercise control
over administrative agency decisionmaking. Signing statements and presidential direc-
tives specifying how an agency should enforce recently enacted legislation are two ways
that Presidents may seek to expand their power during periods of divided government.
Signing statements and pre-enforcement directives are especially important today.
In particular, presidential unilateralism is very much tied to the growing ideological
polarization in Congress. Presidents now have little opportunity to advance their
political agenda before a Congress controlled by the other political party. No longer
are there forces that push Democrats and Republicans towards the political center.
The liberal "Rockefeller Republican" and the conservative "Southern Democrat" have
given way to party loyalists who see themselves as members of a political party, not
as independent power brokers.37 Measures of ideology reveal that the most liberal
Republican in Congress is more conservative than the most conservative Democrat.38
Correspondingly, when legislation is enacted, party cohesion has resulted in a shift
in power to party leaders who see the lawmaking process as a way to stand behind
a unified party message and, in this way, distinguish their party from the other.39
Party polarization has also resulted in a dramatic shift in the locus of governmental
decisionmaking-such that executive and administrative agency action has displaced
lawmaking as the principal source of policymaking. 4° With Democrats and Republicans
embracing conflicting ideological agendas, it is unlikely that Congress and the White
House will enact significant legislation during periods of divided government.4
3 This point and the points made in the balance of this paragraph are drawn from my essay
on how ideological polarization has transformed congressional hearings so that both parties
see congressional hearings as a mechanism to advance their pre-existing political agenda.
Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons from Bill
Van Alstyne's Testimony, 54 DuKE L.J. 1525, 1534-39 (2005). For additional sources, see
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 34, at 2333.
38 Devins, supra note 37, at 1535-36; see also 110th House Rank Ordering, http://voteview
.com/houll0.htm (last updated July 5, 2007).
3' Devins, supra note 37, at 1537-38; see also C. Lawrence Evans, Committees, Leaders,
and Message Politics, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 217 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I.
Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2001).
0 See Kagan, supra note 24, at 2248-50 (discussing emergence of "presidential admin-
istration" during the Clinton administration, a period of divided government).
41 See RICHARD S. CONLEY, THE PRESIDENCY, CONGRESS, AND DIVIDED GOVERNMENT:
A PoSTwAR ASSESSMENT 214-18 (2003) (concluding that ideological divergence has "pro-
duced less room for presidents to find a middle course of action acceptable to both sides");
William Howell et al., Divided Government and the Legislative Productivity of Congress,
2007]
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Relatedly, when legislation is enacted, ideological divergence between Democrats
and Republicans makes it likely that the President and Congress will have competing
spins on legislative meaning. 2
Put another way, during periods of divided government, the fight over government
policymaking is very much a fight over who controls agency decisionmaking. As a
result, the dance that takes place between Congress and the White House has moved.
Rather than battle over presidential vetoes and congressional efforts to statutorily
insulate government agencies from executive control,4 3 Presidents are much more
interested in advancing their policy agenda through unilateral decisions that constrain
agency discretion. In this way, signing statements and other pre-enforcement directives
are important mechanisms by which Presidents can limit congressional influence over
agency decisionmaking.
But why is it that Presidents need to constrain agency discretion this way? The
President appoints executive agency heads, and as such, agencies should adhere to the
President's political agenda. At the same time, as this Part will demonstrate, Presidents
have less control of agency decisionmaking during periods of divided government.'
The sharp ideological divide between Democrats and Republicans spills over to
Congress-agency relations. Specifically, during periods of divided government,
Congress will use its confirmation and oversight powers to push agencies away from
presidential priorities and towards competing congressional preferences.
When delegating power to executive agencies, "Congress takes the risk that the
president will direct agencies to enforce laws in a manner that deviates from Congress's
1945-94, 25 LEGIs. STUD. Q. 285 (2000) (demonstrating a significant decline in landmark
legislation during periods of divided government).
42 See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
43 See DAVID E. LEwiS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 30-36,54-55
(2003) (demonstrating that Congress seeks to create politically insulated agencies during
periods of divided government); David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Divided Government
and the Design of Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical Test, 58 J.
POL. 373 (1996) (demonstrating both that the President vetoes more legislation and that
Congress delegates less authority to executive agencies during periods of divided government);
David W. Rohde & Dennis M. Simon, Presidential Vetoes and Congressional Response: A
Study of Institutional Conflict, 29 AM. J. POL. Sci. 397 (1985) (demonstrating that Presidents
veto more legislation during periods of divided government).
4 This is not to suggest that agencies are not vulnerable to interest group (and other forms
of) capture during periods of unified government. So-called iron triangles between interest
groups, congressional overseers, and agency heads, for example, are purported to limit presi-
dential control of the administrative state. For an overview of this literature (pre-1994), see B.
DAN WOOD & RICHARD W. WATERMAN, BUREAUCRATIC DYNAMICS 18-19 (1994). For exten-
sive case studies involving civil rights interest groups, see HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEvELOPMENTOFNATIONALPOLCXY, 1960-1972, at 363-65 (1990);
Jeremy A. Rabkin, Officefor Civil Rights, in THEPOLrrcs OFREGULATION (James Q. Wilson
ed., 1980). But see MORRIS P. FIORINA, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 104-07 (1992) (arguing that
proliferation of interest groups has diminished the influence of so-called iron triangles).
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intent."45 To reduce that risk, as well as to limit Presidents from unilaterally pursuing
ideologically divergent policy initiatives, Congress typically turns to its oversight and
advise-and-consent powers.' During periods of divided government, Congress seeks
to close the gap between presidential and lawmaker preferences by making aggressive
use of these powers.47
Consider, for example, the Senate's confirmation power. More than anything, the
Senate's willingness to confirm presidential nominees is affected by variation in the
ideological tilt in Congress so that a more liberal Congress is apt to put greater pressure
on a conservative President than is a conservative Congress (and vice versa).48 For
their part, "presidents must anticipate the preferences of the Senate in order to get their
nominees confirmed, and a potential nominee's policy preferences are central to explain-
ing the appointment outcome."4 9 In addition to making sure that their appointees are
confirmed, Presidents are guided by related pragmatic concerns. These include ease
of confirmation, party loyalty, and the need to placate interest groups.5° Even during
periods of unified government, the Senate likewise anticipates that the President will
allow powerful members of Congress the opportunity to "recommend" individuals
who will play key policy roles in government agencies.51
During periods of divided government, these pragmatic concerns push the
President's nominees away from presidential preferences and towards competing
congressional preferences. Most significantly, interest groups that disapprove of
the President's agenda are likely to have more sway with Congress during divided
government. Consequently, a President seeking to avoid a bitter confirmation battle
is likely to appoint nominees who are acceptable to ideologically divergent interest
groups. Alternatively, Presidents may feel compelled to withdraw nominees after
opposition interest groups signal their willingness to launch a confirmation fight.
" Bradley & Posner, supra note 11, at 37.
46 See id.; see also Ronald C. Moe, At Risk: The President's Role as Chief Manager, in
THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY 265, 274 (James P. Pfiffner ed., 2nd ed. 1999).
47 See generally JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE PoLrIcs OF
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT (1990) (examining the reasons behind the growth of congres-
sional oversight).
48 See David C. Nixon, Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology, 20 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 438 (2004).
49 Id. at 439.
'o See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A
CONSTrrUTIONALAND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2000) (analyzing the development of the insti-
tution of federal appointments); Ronald C. Kahn, Presidential Power and the Appointments
Process: Structuralism, Legal Scholarship, and the New Historical Institutionalism, 47 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1419 (1997) (discussing the use of external factors to study presidential
power in the appointments arena).
51 Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61,
136-37 (2006).
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From 1947 to 1949, for example, Democratic President Harry S. Truman buckled to
a Republican-controlled Senate by withdrawing more than two hundred nominations.
52
Increasing ideological polarization in Congress has complicated this dynamic.
With Presidents increasingly making policy through unilateral directives, the President's
opponents in Congress are more likely to use the Senate's confirmation power to
push for ideologically compatible nominees. Lawmakers, likewise, are increasingly
willing to draw out the confirmation process, so much so that Presidents "must make
appointments for which an extraordinarily favorable consensus can emerge."53 In
order to win over a significant number of senators from the opposing party, Presidents
are pressured into making compromises with their political opponents. Needless to
say, during periods of divided government, Congress will push especially hard for
''compromise" nominees.
Combusting (from the President's perspective) with greater congressional
influence on appointments, divided government also brings with it a dramatic rise
in adversarial oversight hearings. By pressuring agency heads, whose Senate confir-
mation might well have been tied to their perceived willingness to break ranks with the
President's policy agenda, the President's opponents in Congress hope to move agency
policymaking towards lawmaker-and away from presidential-preferences.T M This
phenomenon is longstanding: from 1961 to 1977, congressional committees held
roughly twenty-five percent more oversight hearings during divided government than
during unified government.55 And, as noted above, ideological polarization between
Democrats and Republicans makes it even more likely that the majority party in
Congress will aggressively use oversight during periods of divided government.
Exemplifying this phenomenon is the drastic increase in both the rhetoric of
oversight and the pursuit of executive branch wrongdoing during two recent changes
from unified to divided government: the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress
during the Clinton presidency and the 2006 Democratic takeover of Congress during
the George W. Bush presidency. 6 When Bill Clinton was President, Republicans
viewed oversight as integral to a well-functioning democracy. Reflecting the view
52 GERHARDT, supra note 50, at 165; see also id. at 166 (listing other examples).
" Nolan McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive
Branch Nominations, 1885-1996, 43 AM. J. POL. SC. 1122, 1141 (1999).
54 In general, agency heads have strong incentives to work with Congress, irrespective of
divided government and ideological polarization. See Beermann, supra note 51, at 136-37;
Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal-Do
Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REv. 109 (1996) (explaining why agency heads typically turn over
information to Congress-even if the President might be willing to invoke executive privilege).
During periods of divided government, Congress is likely to push for outcomes less to the
President's liking so that the gap between presidential preferences and agency behavior is
likely to increase.
55 ABERBACH, supra note 47, at 60.
56 Ilya Somin & Neal Devins, Can We Make the Constitution More Democratic?, 56
DRAKE L. REv. (forthcoming 2007).
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that power should not be centralized in a too powerful President, Republican Jim
Leach said in 1994 that it is "indefensible that a [Democratically controlled] Congress
charged with oversight lacks the backbone to investigate the executive branch, even
if it may be embarrassing to their party's President." 7 And when Republicans gained
control of Congress, comprehensive federal agency oversight was a top agenda item for
most committees. 8 For example, there was an "impulse among [House] Republicans
to use the Judiciary Committee's oversight role to question lawyers, prosecutors and
senior officials on the [Clinton] Administration's enforcement of environmental,
civil rights and antitrust laws."5 9 Oversight also picked up on national security and
intelligence issues.6" For their part, Democrats accused Republicans of "misusing
Congressional oversight powers to harass and intimidate the Administration."61
But when Democrats took over Congress in 2006, oversight was considered a
necessary part of our system of checks and balances. Complaining that "up until now
the Republican Congress has given [the George W. Bush administration] a blank
check with no oversight, no standards, no conditions," Democrats made oversight
reform a top priority.62 Democrats accused Congressional Republicans of "having
abdicated their responsibility for oversight."63 Domestic spying, telecommunications,
and Federal Drug Administration policymaking headed the list of Democratic targets,
with Senator Robert Byrd, Representatives John Dingell and Henry Waxman, and
other long-time champions of aggressive oversight leading the Democrats' charge.'
Two months into the campaign, House Democratic Caucus Chair Rahm Emanuel
17 Keith Bradsher, House Inquiry is Urged on Clintons' Land Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
12, 1994, at A16.
58 See, e.g., Ellen Messmer, Republicans Promise New Outlook on Telecom Refonn,
NETWORKWORLD, Nov. 14, 1994, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/miqa3649/
is_199411/ain8716272.
" Jason DeParte et al., New Majority's Agenda: Substantial Changes May Be Ahead,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1994, at A26.
60 At the same time, because of their efforts to enact some of the planks from the so-called
Contract with America, oversight slagged a bit at first before picking up, especially in the
national security and intelligence arenas. See Charles Tiefer, Congressional Oversight of the
Clinton Administration and Congressional Procedure, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 199,203-04 (1998).
61 Jerry Gray, G.O.P. Accuses Administration of Political Improprieties, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 1995, at A10.
62 Michael R. Gordon & Jeff Zeleny, Latest Plan Sets a Series of Goals for Iraq Leaders,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2007, at Al (quoting House majority leader Nancy Pelosi).
63 Philip Shenon, As New 'Cop on the Beat,' Congressman Starts Patrol, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6,2007, at A18. Indeed, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton blamed much of the Iraq crisis
on a "Congress [that] was supine under the Republican majority, failing to conduct oversight
and [demand] accountability." David S. Broder, Clinton's Presidential Posturing, WASH.
POST, Jan. 28, 2007, at B7.
64 For an excellent overview of the Democrats' renewed commitment to oversight, see
Brian Friel, The Watchdog Growls, NAT'L. J., Mar. 24, 2007, at 20.
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proudly declared that Democratic oversight had "forced" more Bush administration
officials "out of theirjobs than in the entire prior six years under this administration."65
Whatever one thinks of Emanuel's boast or of similar claims by gloating
Republicans after their 1994 takeover of Congress, it is certainly true that Congress
has more reason to pressure government agencies during periods of divided govern-
ment. Ideological polarization ensures a significant gap in Democratic and Republican
policy preferences; correspondingly, ideological cohesion between Democrats and
Republicans spills over to lawmaker attitudes towards the President. Democrats and
Republicans are more loyal to their parties than ever before and, as such, will want to
undermine a President from the opposition party. The flip side of this coin, of course,
is that Congress is more likely to back the President during periods of unified govern-
ment. Lawmakers are more likely to agree with the President, and more than that,
lawmakers will want to stand behind their party.
What this means, of course, is that Presidents have more reason to advance their
policy initiatives through unilateral action during periods of divided government than
during periods of unified government.' This explains Reagan administration efforts
to centralize presidential power by advancing its vision of the unitary executive;67 it
also explains the first Bush administration's decision to centralize power through the
Quayle Council on Competitiveness;" and, finally, it explains President Clinton's
systematic use of "directive orders to effect policy change through administrative
action."'69 And while it is too early to tell what George W. Bush will do to advance his
policy agenda after the 2006 Democratic takeover of Congress, there is no question
that his best chance to advance his policy agenda will be through unilateral action.70
CONCLUSION
By binding agency heads to the President's preferred policy vision, signing state-
ments and other pre-enforcement directives are especially useful during periods of
65 Id at 22.
' See Joel D. Aberbach & Bert A. Rockman, Hard Times for Presidential Leadership?
(And How Would We Know?), 29 PRESIDENTIAL. STUD. Q. 757, 762 (1999).
67 This is the central point that Christopher S. Kelley makes in his contribution to the
symposium. See Christopher S. Kelley, A Matter of Direction: The Reagan Administration,
the Signing Statement, and the 1986 Westlaw Decision, 16 Win. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 283
(2007).
68 Robert J. Duffy, Divided Government and Institutional Combat: The Case of the
Quayle Council on Competitiveness, 28 POLITY 379 (1996).
69 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 34, at 2363 (discussing Kagan, supra note 24).
'o It is worth noting that before Democrats gained control of Congress in 2007, the vast
majority of President George W. Bush's signing statements laid out constitutional, not policy,
arguments (104 of the 131 signing statements through 2006). Bradley & Posner, supra note
11, at 14. During this six-year period of unified government, President Bush--consistent with
the analysis in this Essay--did not see the need to use signing statements to direct agency heads
on how they should implement federal statutes.
[Vol. 16:63
SIGNING STATEMENTS AND DIVIDED GOVERNMENT
divided government. Agency heads may be less loyal to the President during periods
of divided government; Congress is more likely to use oversight and other techniques
to pressure agency heads. These problems, as discussed above, are exacerbated by ideo-
logical polarization. Furthermore, even if agency heads are loyal to the President, a
presidential signing statement provides cover. It is easier for an agency head to tell a
disappointed committee chair that he is bound by a presidential directive than that his
legal-policy vision does not comport with Congress's vision. And finally, the President
signals to Congress that he cares enough about the issue to specify his preferences
before the agency even has a chance to interpret the statute.
The question remains: why prefer signing statements over other types of pre-
enforcement directives? President Clinton, for example, made limited use of signing
statements and extensive use of another type of pre-enforcement directive: memoranda
specifying how agencies should implement recently enacted laws. In the paragraphs that
follow, I will contend that the answer to this question is highly contextual: Presidents
should sometimes prefer signing statements, but for the most part, there is little reason
for Presidents to prefer signing statements to other types of pre-enforcement directives.
To start, as the controversy over George W. Bush's signing statements (and, with
it, this very symposium) makes clear, signing statements are highly visible.7' They are
far more likely to draw attention than a memorandum detailing presidential priorities.
In this way, signing statements are both subject to intensive media scrutiny and more
likely to galvanize the President's opponents. Along these lines, it is hard to imagine
Congress holding hearings or contemplating legislative reforms on the President's
power to express his policy preferences by way of a memorandum.72 Put another way,
signing statements come at a cost; opponents will have an easier time mobilizing
around a signing statement than a presidential memorandum. 73
Signing statements, moreover, are no more binding on agency officials than are
pre-enforcement directives. White House staff, for example, can pressure agency
officials to follow the dictates of a presidential memorandum as well as a signing
statement. During the Clinton administration, White House staff saw pre-enforcement
memoranda as an invitation to "become involved in agency business. 74
' For similar reasons, the signing statements of Ronald Reagan and the first George Bush
proved to be lightning rods-a focal point for opponents of the President's policies. See Cross,
supra note 25 (Reagan); Steven A. Holmes, With Bush's Stand Uncertain, Lawsuit is
Threatened over New Rights Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1991, at 8.
72 See FISHER, supra note 5.
73 Perhaps for this reason, former Clinton Justice Department official Chris Schroeder's
contribution to this symposium calls attention to the ways that signing statements put Congress
on notice about the President's planned implementation of federal statutes. Podcast: William
& Mary Bill of Rights Journal Symposium: The Last Word? Constitutional Implications of
Presidential Signing Statements (Feb. 3, 2007) (http://www.wm.edu/so/borj/index.htm).
" Kagan, supra note 24, at 2302. Likewise, when defending agency action in court, the
Justice Department would not draw a distinction between signing statements and presidential
memoranda. The Department would view either document as expressing the executive branch
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That Presidents may sometimes see the costs of highly visible signing statements
as being too high-when other types of pre-enforcement directives can be used to limit
agency discretion--does not mean that Presidents ought to disfavor signing statements.
It may be that the President wants to draw attention to his signing statement to let his
constituents know that he is firmly committed to a particular policy agenda.75 And
the President may hope that courts will look to his signing statement in sorting out the
meaning of some federal statute.76 Also, the President may see signing statements as
a volley in a conversation with Congress-a chance to see if lawmakers will rise up
in opposition to the President's planned implementation of a statute.
There are other advantages to signing statements-advantages tied to the President's
efforts to advance his policy agenda through agency decisionmaking. By placing their
views in the open, signing statements allow Presidents to put an exclamation mark
behind their policy preferences. In so doing, the focus of congressional and interest
group opprobrium will be with the White House, and as such, signing statements may
provide more cover for agency heads than a presidential directive. In this way, sign-
ing statements may do a betterjob of signaling lawmakers and agency heads that the
President has intense preferences so that agency heads will have less wiggle room
to navigate around a signing statement than other types of presidential directives.77
Signing statements offer one other advantage. Agencies, working with the Office
of Management and Budget, play a more extensive role in the writing of signing state-
ments than in the preparation of presidential memoranda.18 To the extent that agency
heads feel some sense of ownership of the signing statement or, alternatively, under-
stand that the White House rejects their legal or policy preferences, it is possible that
agency heads will be more faithful to the commands delineated in signing statements
as compared to other presidential directives.
position on a legal policy question.
" Advisors to Presidents Reagan and Clinton, for example, recognized that one of the
benefits of signing statements was largely hortatory; they emphasized the President's ability
to speak to his supporters and other constituents through the unique bully pulpit of a signing
statement ceremony. See KMIEc, supra note 6, at 52-53 (Reagan); Dellinger, supra note 28,
at 333 (Clinton).
76 For an argument that courts should defer to presidential signing statements, see Bradley
& Posner, supra note 11. For an argument that courts should generally not defer to signing
statements, see William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative History: A Critique,
66 IND. L.J. 699, 715-16 (1991) (arguing that courts should defer to signing statements only
in two situations); Comment, Whose Statute Is It Anyway ?: Why and How Courts Should Use
Presidential Signing Statements When Interpreting Federal Statutes, 46 CATH. U.L. REV.
475 (1997) (arguing that courts should defer to signing statements or use them in only three
situations).
77 The use of signing statements to shape agency policymaking, as I mentioned in this
Essay's introduction, is of fairly recent vintage. Consequently, there is little in the way of
empirical evidence to assess the binding nature of signing statements (as compared, say, to
presidential memoranda).
78 Kelley, supra note 6, at 55-56.
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Time will tell whether future Presidents will seek to bind agencies through signing
statements or other types of pre-enforcement directives. What is clear is that Presidents
should use pre-enforcement directives in periods of divided government. Against the
backdrop of ideological polarization in Congress, Presidents have strong incentives
to pressure agency heads to adhere to their preferred vision of the law. In sharp contrast,
there is little reason for Presidents to issue policy-oriented signing statements or pre-
enforcement memoranda during periods of unified government. Presidents can work
informally with agency heads and Congress during these times.79 Moreover, Congress
is likely to back the President, and the President is likely to appoint agency heads
whose policy views match up with presidential and congressional preferences.
" For this very reason, Presidents should use signing statements to make bully pulpit
pronouncements about the scope of presidential power during periods of unified government.
See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text (suggesting a connection between George W.
Bush's 2001-2006 signing statement campaign and Republican control of Congress).
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